AB-KV-Ch15
Tipitaka >> Abhidhamma Pitaka >> Kathavatthu >> ‘’’Kathavatthu Ch15’’’ Pali Versions : Pali English Version and Pali Devanagri Version =Kathavatthu Chapter15= 508. Of Correlation as specifically fixed 293 BOOK XV 1. Of Correlation as specifically fixed. Controverted Point. — That one phenomenon can be re- lated to another in one way only. From the Commentary. — Some, like the Mahasanghikas, hold that if anything be correlated to another as its moral condition or motive (h etu), 1 it is not correlated to that other by way of subject-object, or of contiguity, or of immediate succession. 3 Or again, if anything be correlated to another as its object, it is not correlated to that other by way of contiguity, or immediate succession. 1 Tk . — Bat take the attitude of investigation, 3 is not that correlated both as moral condition and as dominance ? You assent. Then your proposition falls through. Again, is not predominant desire-to-do the dominant factor in coexistent mental states? If so, we ought to admit a dual correlation by way of i. dominance, ii. co- existence. 2 The same holds when energy is the dominant factor. Or if dominant energy be considered as ‘controlling power’ or faculty (indriya), we ought to admit a dual correlation by way of dominance and controlling power. Or if we consider dominant energy as a factor of the Path, 4 we ought to admit a dual correlation by way of dominance and path or means (magga). 3 The same holds when apperception 4 is the dominant factor. Or if dominant con- sciousness be considered as nutriment (or cauBe, ahara), 1 See (Compendium, p. 279 f. 2 Ibid., 191, § 7. 3 Vimajsa. Ibid., 177, n. 3. This in terms of hetu is amoha=pann a = intelligence, understanding, insight. 4 C i 1 1 a in this connection is an abbreviation for j a v a n a-c i 1 1 a, apperceptional consciousness. 294 Of Correlation as specifically fixed XV. 1. we ought to admit a dual correlation by way of do min ance and nutriment. 4 The argument holds when we consider conscious dominance as controlling power, or investigation as a dominant factor, or, again, as part of the Path, or means. Once more, if, on adequately revering an Ariyan phenomenon, 1 reflection arises having that phenomenon as its dominant object, we ought here to admit the dual relation — dominance and object. 5 Or again, if this or that previous moral consciousness be related to this or that subsequent moral consciousness as consecutive, and is also repeated, have we not to admit here the dual correlation of contiguity and repetition? 2 6 The same being valid for immoral states? 7 The same correlation being valid if, for moral, or immoral, we substitute ‘ inoperative ’ or ‘ unmoral ’ states ? 8 M. — Nevertheless, you admit the definitely distinct modes of correlation, such as ‘moral condition, or hetu,’ contiguity, immediate succession ? Then surely my pro- position is right. 2. Of Reciprocal 3 Correlation. Controverted Point. — That whereas actions are conditioned by ignorance, we may not Say that ignorance is conditioned by actions. 1 D ha mm a; i.e., a Path, a Fruit, Nibbana, corruptions ex- tirpated, or not yet extirpated. On this specific culture see Com- pendium, pp. 58, 69. 2 Asevana, from asevati, to serve over and over again (a + si, or s i, to bind, hence to be a pendant, or dependent), is a difficult term to translate. In the Compendium (p. 192, § 12) we used ‘ succession,' but repetition, or even retention, is in some respects better. The Burmese translators render by ‘repetition so as to form a habit’; hence, habitual repetition. 3 Anna-m-anha, or one-another. The discourse shows that a classification of relations in recent philosophy has been anticipated. See Hon. Bertrand Bussell’s Our Knowledge of the External World, etc., London, 1914, p. 47. See Appendix : P a c c a y a . 510. Oj Asymmetrical Relations 295 From the Commentary. — This view, held, for instance, by the Mahasanghikas, is met by the opposite doctrine that there is a reciprocal conditioning obtaining between ignorance and actions, and so on. 1 1 Th. — But is not ignorance coexistent with action? 2 If so, here is a reciprocal correlation of coexist- ence. 2 Again, £ grasping is conditioned by craving.’ Now, is it wrong to say that craving is conditioned by grasping? 3 Yes, you say. But the argument above is valid here also. 3 M . — £ Birth, bhikkhus, is conditioned by decay and death, the tendency to become is conditioned by birth ’ — is the Suttanta thus ? Th. — No. M. — Neither is the reciprocal conditioning correlation between ignorance and activities reciprocal, nor that be- tween craving and grasping. 4 Th. — ‘ Mind and body, bhikkhus, are conditioned by rebirth-consciousness, and this by mind and body ’ — is the Suttanta thus ? 4 5 .M— Yes. Th— Then the conditioning relation may be reciprocal. 3. Of Duration. 6 Controverted Point. — That duration is predetermined. From the Commentary. — Taking the word duration (addha) in the sense of period of time, they 6 who hold this opinion base it on the 1 Namely, in the Paticca-samuppada formula ; see VI. 2. 2 S a n k h a r e n a. ‘ Here only non-meritorious activity is meant. The correlation between this and ignorance may be analyzed into “related by way of co-existence, reciprocity, presence, continuance, association.” ’ — Corny. 3 Here ‘grasping’ excludes k a m a-grasping (which =t an ha). — Corny. On the four ‘graspings ’ see Bud. Psy. Btli., pp. 328 f. 4 Sayyutta-Nik., iii. 114. 5 The opponent evidently uses addha in this sense, suggestive of M. Bergson’s concept of time. 0 No adherents are named. Possibly the Andhakas. See above, XI. 8. 296 Duration as Divisible Reality XV. 1 8. Suita quoted below. The argument seeks to show that no interval whatever is predetermined, except as mere time-notion. But matter, etc., when meaning the five aggregates (bodily and mental) is pre- determined. 1 Th. — Then must duration be one of the five aggre- gates, which of course it is not. This holds good whether you take past, 1 2 future, or present duration. 8 Now, you say that any past aggregate, bodily or mental, consti- tutes past duration ; any future, any present aggregate, future or present duration respectively. Then are there five past durations, five future, five present durations ? . . . 4 fifteen durations in all ? Or, if they are regarded as twelve past, future, present organs-ancl-objects-of-sense, are there thirty-six durations in all ? . . . 6 Or if we consider them as eighteen elements, are there fifty-four durations? or as controlling powers, 2 are there sixty-six durations ? 6 Opp. — But was it not said by the Exalted One : ‘ There are these three subjects of discourse , 3 hhikkhus — which are the three ? One, may talk about past time : “ Thus was it in times past.” Or about future time : “ Thus will it be in future times.” Or about the present: “Thus is it now at present ” ’ ? 4 Hence surely duration is predetermined ? 4. Of Instants, Moments , 5 Seconds of Time. Controverted Point . — That any stroke of time is pre- determined. From the Commentary . — The same argument is followed as in the foregoing. 1 Insert A manta in PTS edition. 2 See above, p. 15 f. 3 II a t h a v a 1 1 h u n i . 4 Anguttara-Nik i. 197. Cf. p. 95, § 60. 6 Khana, laya, muhutta: 10 £ instants’ = l ‘moment,’ 10 ‘ moments’ = 1 ‘second.’ There is no measured coincidence between second and muhutta. 514. Is a Vitiating Thing Vice t 297 5. Of the Intoxicants ( Asava’s ). Controverted Point. — That the four asava’s are them- selves non-asava. 1 From the Commenta/ry. — The Hetuvadins hold that, inasmuch as over and above the four Intoxicants there is no other Intoxicant with which they can be said to be ‘ co-intoxicants,’ therefore they must themselves be non-intoxicant.’ 1 Th. — Then yon must be prepared to classify them with one of the approved non-asava’s — the Path, Fruit, Nibbana, one of the four Paths or Fruits, one of the Factors of Enlightenment — which you, of course, may not do. 2 H. — If I am wrong, I ask you to show me any other asava, concomitant with which those four may be pro- nounced co-asava. , . . 6. Of Decay and Death . Controverted Point. — That the decay and death of spiritual 2 things is itself spiritual. 3 From the Commentary. — Decay and death are not predetermined, and therefore do not come under the categories ‘mundane,’ ‘supra- mundane.’ The Mahasanghikas and others do not grasp this salient feature. 1 Th. — Then you must be prepared to classify it with one of the approved spiritual things— Path, Fruit, Nibbana, etc. 4 . . . For instance, is the decay and death of the Stream- Winner’s Path the Path itself? If you deny, your proposition falls through. If you assent, you 1 The four are sensuous desires of life renewed, erroneous opinion, ignorance. See Compendium, 227; Biod. Psy. Eth., iii., ch. iv. 2 Or supramundane, or transcendental (lokuttara). 3 Of. above, XI. 8, on the falsely including the notion ‘imperma- nence ’ among things impermanent. * 4 See XY. 5. 298 Decline and the Declining Thing XV. 6. must also apply your proposition to all the other stages, and say, finally, that the decay and death of the fruit of arahantship is itself fruit of arahantship — which you may not. Nor will you he prepared to admit decay and death as identical with any one of the Factors of Enlighten- ment. 2 M. — Then, is the decay and death of supramundane things a mundane thing ? You deny. 1 Then it must be supramundane. 7. Of Trance. Controverted Point . — That to attain cessation of con- sciousness is supramundane. From the Commentary . — Inasmuch as what is called or attaining cessation of feeling and perception is not a positive mental state, but is the suspension of the mental aggregates, it is neither a mundane nor a supramundane state. Some, however, like the Hetuvadins, hold that since it is certainly not mundane, it must be supramundane. The argument is similar to that in XV. 5 1, ancl 6 2. 8. The Same ( continued ). Controverted Point. — That to attain cessation of con- sciousness is mundane. 1 Th. — You must, then, be prepared to classify it as one of the things admittedly mundane — the five aggregates, or as belonging to one of the three spheres of life, that of sense, or the Rupa or Arupa worlds — which you refuse to do. 2 Similar to 6 2. 1 The Buddha himself did not clasB it as of either c&tegory^-Comy. 517. Trance ancl Death 299 9. Of Trance (iii.). Controverted Point. — That a person may die while in a state of trance. From the Commentary .—The Kajagirikas and others hold that since life is so uncertain, even one who has attained in Jhana to trance may die, no less than anyone else. The argument shows that there is 1 a time for dying and for not dying. 1 Th . — You must, then, admit that, while in that state, he has all the mental symptoms 2 betokening death — to wit, in mental contact, feeling, perception, volition, conscious- ness. But you agree that all moribund mental symptoms are absent. Hence your proposition falls through. 2 You will further agree with this : not only that for one in a state of trance is all mental life in abeyance, but also that death is accompanied by contactual, emotional, volitional, and cognitive symptoms. 2 3 Moreover, can poison, weapons, or fire affect the body of one in trance? You deny. 3 You assert, on the con- trary, that those causes of death cannot affect him. Then, can you maintain your proposition ? 4 Or do you now maintain that poison, weapons, or fire can affect his body? 4 Then, is his attainment not genuine? . . . US ' — But in opposing my proposition you imply that there must be some principle of certainty (or uniformity) by which one is assured of not dying while in trance. If you say that such an assurance does not exist, your proposition cannot stand. 5 Th . — But one who is enjoying visual consciousness is not dying, even though there be no uniform principle of certainty by which he is assured of being kept from death. Hence I assert as much of one who is in trance. 1 Bead, for samapannaya, samanaya. 2 This word is not in the Pali text. 3 Because of the abnormal power of his attainment. — Corny. 4 ‘ He assents because of the body’s natural liabilities. Hence there is no abnormal power in the attainment? — Corny. 5 In Commentary , PTS edition, read, for sakavadissa, para- v a d i s s a. 300 Spiritual Trance XV. 10. 10. Of Trance as a Means of reaching the Unconscious Sphere. Controverted Point. — That trance conduces to rebirth in the unconscious sphere* From the Commentary. — Some, like the Hetuvadins, make no distinction between the two kinds of trance-attainment : the merely mundane, practised by worldly folks, and the supramundane, or spiritual. The former does conduce to rebirth in the sphere of un- conscious life, the latter does not. 1 Th. — Can you say of anyone who has attained to trance that his character are the three moral conditions — absence of greed, of hate, of dulness, also faith, energy, mindfulness, concentration, and understanding? Is not the contrary usually the case ? . . . 2 You admit of course that one in trance is without mental reaction, feeling, perception, volition, cognition? But you cannot maintain that a Path 1 can he practised in the absence of these. 8 Finally, your proposition implies that all who attain to trance are tending to rebirth in the Unconscious Sphere — which you must deny. . . . 4 II . But you admit, anyway, that in trance one is unconscious, and in that sphere one is unconscious. Hence I maintain that this tendency is a fact. 11. Of Karma and its Accumulation. Controverted Point. — That karma is one thing, its accumu- lation 2 is another. From- the Commentary. — They who hold this view, for instance the Andhakas and Sammitiyas, judge that the accumulating of karma goes on automatically, independently of moral action, of mental action. 1 Magga, ‘path,’ is used, more generally, to denote a systematic ‘ means,’ or method conducing to celestial rebirth. It is only the Ariyan Path or Paths that are means leading away from rebirth. — Bud. Fay. Mh., pp. 43 f. ; 71 f. ; 82 f. 2 Upacaya may be rendered by ‘ conservation.’ 520. Karma as Process and Product 301 1 TU . — Are you then prepared to admit that each mental phase— mental reaction, feeling, perception, voli- tion, cognition, also faiths energy, mindfulness, concen- tration, understanding, also the ten corruptions (kilesa’s) — is a different thing from its accumulation? Of course not. Then neither can you affirm your proposition. 2 Again, do you imply that karmic accumulation is coexistent with karma? You deny? But think! You assent. 1 Then fortiori meritorious (or good) karma is coexistent with good karmic accumulation? No? Nay, you must admit it is. Then follows that karma, inseparably conjoined with feeling, is both coexistent with its accumulation, and also inseparably conjoined with corre- sponding feeling. 3 Similarly for demeritorious (or bad) karma. 4 Again, you admit of course that karma is coexistent with consciousness and has a mental object, but you do not admit as much of its accumulation. That is to say, you agree that karma, being coexistent with consciousness, is broken off mental process when consciousness is broken off. But, by your view of the different nature of karmic accumulation, you hold that when consciousness stops, karmic accumulation does not necessarily stop. So that we may get a cessation of karma as conscious process, and a continuation of karmic accumulation as product ! 5 You admit, further, that karmic accumulation is where karma is. 2 Surely this implies that an act (kamm a) and its (accumulation or) conservation is one and the same thing. . . . And that, the conservation of karmic energy being where karma is, result is produced from that conserva- tion ; and that you must conclude that there is no differ- 1 ‘ Karma is “ conjoined with, consciousness ” ; its accumulation, by the thesis, is automatic, hence the vacillation/ — Corny. 2 K am m a m hi=k am me sati, or patitthite. ‘Where there is karma, or where it is established, the “ accumulating” begins, but the latter lasts till results mature. Just as the seed retains all the plant-energy till it sprouts/ — Corny. 302 Karma as Process and Product XY. 11. ence in kind between karma, its conservation and its result. 1 Yet this you deny. Now you have admitted that karma has a mental object, 2 and you also admit course that result, which is pro- duced from the conservation of karma, has a mental object. But you deny that the conservation is of this nature, even while you admit that where karma is, there, too, is its con- servation, producing the result ! . . . 6 Finally, was it not said by the Exalted One : Here, Punna, is one who plans activities in deed, word and thought, either malevolent or benevolent. In consequence hereof he is reborn in a world either of malevolence or of benevolence ; and when his mental reaction to good and bad shall set in, his sensations are in accordance herewith, and Ms feel- ings are a mixture of pleasure and pain, as is the case with human beings, with certain of the devas, and with some of the fallen angels . 3 Now thus, Punna, is the rebirth of creatures conspicuous and obscure: 4 — by that which he does is he reborn, and being reborn mental reactions affect him. And *so I say, Punna, that beings are the heirs of their own actions (karma) P Hence it is not right to say that conservation of karma is a thing apart from karma itself. 1 He asks concerning the oneness of these three.— Corny. 2 See above, § 4. 3 Vinipatika, asuras. 4 Bhutabhutassa. Gf. the term bhavabhavesu, Pss. of the Brethren, 305, n. 4. 5 Majjhima-NiJc., i. 390.